Evidence-Oriented Architecture for Modern DFIR: Multilayer Correlation, Mathematical Formalization of Timeline Reconstruction, and Automated Orchestration in Hybrid Environments

1. Introduction

Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) has become an essential discipline for organizations facing advanced persistent threats (APT), ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) campaigns, and automated exploitation of critical vulnerabilities. The growing adoption of hybrid architectures — integrating on-premises infrastructure, cloud services, and containerized environments — significantly expands the attack surface and the investigative complexity (BEHL; BEHL, 2017; SCARFONE; SOULE, 2020).

Historically, digital forensic investigations relied on static disk image acquisition, manual artifact analysis, and manual correlation of event logs. However, such approaches become insufficient in environments characterized by computational elasticity, ephemeral instances, and massive volumes of telemetry (CASEY, 2019). Modern environments generate data from multiple layers: network, endpoint, identity, cloud services, and containerized workloads.

Widely documented incidents demonstrate how quickly attacks can escalate after initial exploitation. The Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228), for example, enabled large-scale remote code execution within hours of public disclosure (NIST, 2021). Similarly, the CVE-2023-23397 vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook enabled silent exfiltration of NTLM hashes through specially crafted messages (MITRE, 2023).

Threat intelligence reports indicate that adversary dwell time in compromised environments remains significant. The M-Trends 2023 report reported a global median dwell time of 16 days, demonstrating gaps in incident detection and investigation (MANDIANT, 2023).

In this context, the following central technical problem arises: how can heterogeneous evidence be formalized and automatedly correlated to reconstruct complex attack chains with temporal precision and reduced investigative ambiguity?

We formulate three research questions:

RQ1: How can the reconstruction of forensic timelines in distributed and heterogeneous environments be mathematically modeled?

RQ2: What is the quantitative impact of multi-layer correlation on reducing mean time to investigate (MTTI) and lowering false positives?

RQ3: How can consolidated security tools be integrated into a verifiable, scalable, and operationally viable architecture for security operations centers?

The main contributions of this work are:

• C1: We propose a mathematical formalization based on directed acyclic graphs for reconstructing attack chains.
• C2: We develop a multi-layer architecture for ingestion, normalization, and automated correlation of evidence.
• C3: We empirically demonstrate quantitative gains in a hybrid environment using MITRE ATT&CK-aligned scenarios.

2. Background and Related Work

Digital forensic computing involves the application of scientific methods to the identification, preservation, analysis, and presentation of digital evidence (CARRIER, 2005). This field has evolved significantly over the last two decades, keeping pace with changes in computer system architectures and the techniques employed by attackers.

The NIST SP 800-61r2 guide defines a widely adopted incident response model structured into four main phases: preparation, detection and analysis, containment/eradication, and post-incident activities (CICHONSKI et al., 2012). Although this model provides important operational guidance, it does not offer mathematical formalization for systematic event reconstruction.

Modern security monitoring and analysis tools produce large volumes of telemetry. Among the most relevant categories are:

Category	Tool Examples	Telemetry Type
SIEM	Elastic, Splunk	Log correlation and aggregation
EDR	Microsoft Defender, CrowdStrike	Endpoint telemetry
NDR	Zeek, Suricata	Network traffic analysis
Memory forensics	Volatility 3	RAM artifact analysis
CNAPP	Prisma Cloud, Wiz	Cloud workload telemetry

In recent years, research has begun to explore graph-based models for representing malicious activity and analyzing dependencies between events (HASSAN et al., 2019). Provenance computing systems record causal relationships among processes, files, and network flows, enabling the identification of anomalous behavior.

Despite these advances, important gaps remain. Many approaches focus on real-time detection but do not robustly address retrospective reconstruction of attack chains with evidentiary value. In addition, the heterogeneity of data sources — including logs from cloud providers such as AWS CloudTrail and Azure Activity Logs — makes consistent event correlation difficult.

Another relevant trend in recent years is the use of eBPF (extended Berkeley Packet Filter)-based telemetry, which enables efficient Linux kernel instrumentation for system-level security event collection (GREGG, 2020). This type of instrumentation significantly expands investigative visibility.

3. Threat Model and Problem Formalization

We assume an adversary with capabilities aligned with the tactics documented in the MITRE ATT&CK framework (MITRE, 2023), including:

• remote command execution (T1059),
• credential dumping (T1003),
• lateral movement via SMB or WinRM (T1021),
• data exfiltration through encrypted channels (T1041).

We model the total set of events observed in the system as:

$$ E = {e_1, e_2, …, e_n} $$

Each event $e_i$ is defined as a tuple:

$$ e_i = (t_i, s_i, d_i, a_i, c_i) $$

where:

• $t_i$ represents the event timestamp;
• $s_i$ indicates the source;
• $d_i$ represents the destination;
• $a_i$ corresponds to the executed action;
• $c_i$ contains additional context (file hash, PID, user, IP address, or instance identifier).

We then construct a directed graph:

$$ G = (V, A) $$

where $V = E$ and $A$ represents the set of causal relationships between events.

Formally:

$$ A = {(e_i, e_j) \mid t_i < t_j \land related(e_i, e_j)} $$

The function $related(e_i, e_j)$ evaluates semantic dependencies between events, such as:

• parent-child process relationship,
• network session continuity,
• credential reuse,
• access to the same artifact.

The investigative objective is to find a chain $C$ that maximizes the likelihood of the observed causal sequence:

$$ \max_{C \subseteq G} P(C \mid E) $$

This model makes it possible to represent attacks as trajectories in temporal graphs.

4. Proposed Methodology

The proposed architecture follows a five-layer pipeline:

1. Telemetry collection
2. Event normalization
3. Temporal correlation
4. Probabilistic inference
5. Orchestration and response

The collection layer integrates multiple data sources, including network sensors (Suricata, Zeek), endpoint telemetry (Sysmon), and cloud logs (AWS CloudTrail). In Linux environments, additional events can be captured via eBPF.

Event normalization uses the Elastic Common Schema (ECS), making it possible to standardize fields such as IP, user, process, and file hash (ELASTIC, 2023).

The temporal graph construction algorithm is described below:

Algorithm 1: BuildAttackGraph(E)
Input: Event set E
Output: Directed acyclic graph G

1: Sort E by timestamp
2: Initialize graph G
3: for each event e_i in E:
4:   for each event e_j where t_j > t_i:
5:       if Correlate(e_i, e_j):
6:           AddEdge(G, e_i, e_j)
7: return G

Computational complexity consists of:

• initial sorting: $O(n \log n)$
• correlation within temporal window $k$: $O(nk)$

5. Implementation

The experimental implementation uses the following technology stack:

Component	Tool	Function
SIEM	Elastic Stack 8.x	Ingestion and correlation
NDR	Suricata 7	Traffic inspection
NDR	Zeek 6	Network behavioral analysis
Endpoint	Sysmon v15	Process telemetry
Forensics	Volatility 3	Memory analysis
SOAR	TheHive 5 + Cortex	Response orchestration

Example Sigma rule used to identify suspicious access to the LSASS process:

logsource:
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 10
    TargetImage: 'lsass.exe'
condition: selection

The experimental infrastructure was run on a Kubernetes cluster with six nodes, each containing 32 vCPU and 128 GB of memory.

6. Experimental Evaluation

The experimental environment used 37 scenarios based on the MITRE ATT&CK framework. The total volume of data analyzed reached approximately 1.2 TB.

Metric	Baseline (SIEM)	Proposed architecture
Average MTTI	14.8 h	8.5 h
False positives	18.3%	13.2%
Correctly reconstructed chains	61.4%	92.8%

We observed a 42.7% reduction in mean investigation time and an approximately 28% decrease in the false positive rate.

The system processed approximately 18,000 events per second, with an average correlation latency of 3.4 seconds.

7. Case Study

We simulated a multistage ransomware attack composed of the following phases:

1. exploitation of a ProxyShell vulnerability on an Exchange server;
2. deployment of a web shell;
3. credential extraction via LSASS dump;
4. lateral movement using PsExec;
5. data exfiltration via the Rclone tool.

Reconstruction of the attack graph made it possible to identify the complete chain in approximately 11 minutes after initial event ingestion.

Among the main observations, the following stand out:

• correlation between memory events and network traffic was fundamental to identifying the credential extraction phase;
• time synchronization inconsistencies between hosts can introduce errors in timeline reconstruction;
• automation via SOAR significantly reduced manual triage effort.

8. Discussion

The results obtained indicate that the mathematical formalization of event reconstruction significantly reduces investigative ambiguities. Graph-based representations make it possible to capture complex dependencies between events that would be difficult to identify through log correlation alone.

However, some limitations remain. The effectiveness of the model depends on the quality and integrity of the collected telemetry. Environments with insufficient logging or limited data retention may impair attack-chain reconstruction.

In addition, end-to-end encryption techniques and covert channels may reduce the visibility of malicious activities at the network level.

For security operations centers, our results suggest three main practical implications: integration between network and endpoint telemetry, log standardization through schemas such as ECS, and the adoption of investigative automation via SOAR platforms.

9. Conclusion

We presented an evidence-driven architecture for digital forensic investigation in modern hybrid environments. The proposed formal model uses directed acyclic graphs to represent causal relationships between events, enabling structured reconstruction of attack chains.

The experimental evaluation demonstrated significant improvements in relevant operational metrics, including reduced mean investigation time and increased accuracy in incident reconstruction.

Future research may explore integration with machine learning techniques for automatic prioritization of the most likely attack chains, as well as formal methods for evidentiary validation of digital evidence in legal contexts.

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