A Formal and Operational Architecture for Threat-Driven AppSec: Integration of SAST, DAST, SCA, Runtime Telemetry, and ATT&CK Intelligence for Risk-Based Prioritization Based on Exploitable Risk

1. Introduction

The attack surface of modern applications has expanded significantly with the spread of distributed architectures based on microservices, REST APIs, containers, and automated continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) pipelines. In this scenario, applications become highly dynamic systems composed of multiple interdependent components, frequently deployed in cloud environments and orchestrated by platforms such as Kubernetes. This architectural transformation has increased the complexity of application security management and introduced new exploitation vectors (BEHL; BEHL, 2017).

Recent reports indicate that web applications continue to rank among the main compromise vectors in security incidents. The Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report states that the exploitation of vulnerabilities in public-facing applications remains a recurring technique in attack campaigns (VERIZON, 2023). In addition, widely publicized incidents — such as Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) — have demonstrated that vulnerabilities in widely used libraries can generate systemic impacts at a global scale (CHEN et al., 2022).

Within the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, several techniques are directly related to application exploitation. Among them, T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application), T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter), and T1195 (Supply Chain Compromise) stand out, and are frequently observed in the initial phases of attack chains (MITRE, 2024). Nevertheless, traditional application security tools operate predominantly in isolation.

Static analysis tools (SAST) inspect source code for vulnerability patterns. Dynamic testing tools (DAST) execute simulated attacks against running applications. Software composition analysis tools (SCA) identify vulnerable dependencies in third-party libraries. Although each approach provides relevant evidence, the absence of systematic correlation among these sources generates a large volume of alerts and makes remediation prioritization difficult.

The central problem investigated in this work is the structural fragmentation between vulnerability detection mechanisms and mechanisms for observing actual exploitation. In enterprise environments, it is common for thousands of alerts to be generated weekly by SAST and SCA tools, while DAST tests produce additional results that are not always correlated with events observed in production.

From this gap, we formulate the following research questions:

RQ1: How can multiple sources of application security evidence be integrated in a formally consistent and quantitatively measurable manner?

RQ2: Is it possible to reduce false positives and prioritize potentially exploitable vulnerabilities through correlation with runtime-observed telemetry?

RQ3: What is the operational impact of this integration on the efficiency of vulnerability triage and mitigation?

The main contributions of this work are:

• Mathematical formalization of an exploitable risk model based on conditional probability.
• Proposal of an operational architecture that integrates SAST, DAST, SCA, and runtime monitoring aligned with MITRE ATT&CK.
• Quantitative experimental evaluation demonstrating a significant reduction in false positives and improved vulnerability prioritization.

2. Background and Related Work

2.1 Static Application Security Testing

Static security analysis is based on code inspection without executing the program. Formally, we represent the execution flow by a directed graph $G = (V, E)$, in which $V$ represents instructions or basic blocks and $E$ represents control transitions.

Injection vulnerabilities can be modeled as data-flow paths between untrusted sources $S$ and sensitive sinks $K$:

$$ \exists ; path(S_i \rightarrow K_j) \land \neg sanitized(S_i) $$

Modern tools such as Semgrep and SonarQube use semantic pattern-based analysis and declarative rules to detect such paths (OWASP, 2023).

2.2 Dynamic Application Security Testing

DAST executes active tests against running applications, seeking to identify vulnerable behaviors at runtime. Tools such as OWASP ZAP and Burp Suite perform HTTP parameter fuzzing, payload manipulation, and server response analysis.

Studies indicate that DAST is particularly effective in identifying vulnerabilities related to configuration, authentication, and input validation (SCANDARIATO et al., 2013).

2.3 Software Composition Analysis

A large portion of modern software depends on external libraries. Consequently, vulnerabilities in dependencies can affect applications even when the application’s own code does not contain direct flaws.

The generation of a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) has become a recommended practice following government initiatives to improve supply chain security (NIST, 2021). SCA tools analyze dependencies and correlate versions with vulnerability databases such as NVD.

2.4 Runtime Telemetry and eBPF

In recent years, sensors based on eBPF have become widely used for observability and security in Linux environments. Tools such as Falco use eBPF to monitor system calls and detect anomalous behaviors (FALCO, 2024).

At the same time, network intrusion detection systems such as Suricata make it possible to identify exploitation patterns observed in network traffic (OISF, 2023).

2.5 Limitations of Current Approaches

Several studies point to limitations in vulnerability prioritization based exclusively on CVSS severity (BOHANNON; HOLMES, 2022). Probabilistic metrics such as EPSS have been proposed to estimate exploitation likelihood, but they still do not integrate runtime observational evidence.

Our approach seeks to fill this gap through probabilistic correlation among multiple sources of evidence.

3. Threat Model and Problem Formalization

We assume an external adversary with the capability to:

• perform automated scanning of exposed services;
• exploit vulnerabilities in public-facing applications;
• execute arbitrary code through vulnerable libraries;
• exploit compromise in the software supply chain.

We define exploitable risk $R_e$ as:

$$ R_e = P(E \mid V, T, C) \cdot I $$

where:

• $V$ represents the presence of a detected vulnerability;
• $T$ represents evidence observed in runtime telemetry;
• $C$ represents operational context (network exposure, privileges, criticality);
• $E$ represents the occurrence of exploitation;
• $I$ represents the potential impact.

The probability of exploitation is estimated by Bayesian inference:

$$ P(E|V,T) = \frac{P(T|E,V)P(E|V)}{P(T|V)} $$

The security policy establishes a threshold $\theta$ such that vulnerabilities with $R_e > \theta$ should be prioritized for immediate remediation.

4. Proposed Methodology

The proposed architecture is composed of four main layers.

Layer	Function	Tool Examples
Collection	Execution of scanners and event collection	Semgrep, ZAP, Dependency-Check, Falco
Normalization	Data standardization	JSON Schema, SBOM CycloneDX
Correlation	Probabilistic inference	Bayesian engine
Prioritization	Risk ranking generation	SIEM integration

Correlation algorithm:

Input: SAST, DAST, SCA results and runtime events
Output: prioritized list of vulnerabilities

for each vulnerability v:
    s1 = score_sast(v)
    s2 = score_dast(v)
    s3 = score_sca(v)
    t  = runtime_evidence(v)

    p_exploit = bayesian_model(s1, s2, s3, t)
    risk = impact(v)  p_exploit

    add(v, risk)

sort_list_by_risk()
return_list()

The dominant complexity is the sorting step, resulting in $O(n \log n)$.

5. Implementation

The architecture was implemented in a Kubernetes environment with direct integration into the CI/CD pipeline.

Pipeline used:

• Stage 1 — static analysis with Semgrep
• Stage 2 — dependency analysis with OWASP Dependency-Check
• Stage 3 — SBOM generation in CycloneDX format
• Stage 4 — dynamic testing with OWASP ZAP
• Stage 5 — deployment to a staging environment monitored by Falco

Example Falco rule:

- rule: Reverse Shell Detection
  desc: Detects shell execution with external connection
  condition: spawned_process and proc.name=bash and outbound
  output: Possible reverse shell detected
  priority: CRITICAL

Events are sent to the Elastic Stack for correlation and indexing.

6. Experimental Evaluation

The experimental evaluation was conducted on infrastructure composed of three Dell PowerEdge R740 servers running Kubernetes 1.27.

Parameter	Value
Memory per node	128 GB
Total CPU	96 vCPUs
Applications tested	32
Known vulnerabilities	187

The metrics used were Precision, Recall, and F1-score.

Method	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Isolated SAST	0.61	0.74	0.67
Isolated DAST	0.68	0.59	0.63
Proposed architecture	0.84	0.86	0.85

We observed a 37.4% reduction in false positives and a decrease in mean triage time from 4.2 hours to 3.0 hours.

7. Case Study

We used the vulnerable OWASP Juice Shop application to validate the model.

Observed flow:

1. SAST detected unsanitized data flow.
2. DAST confirmed exploitation via an SQL Injection payload.
3. Suricata identified the SQLi attack signature.
4. Falco detected anomalous execution after simulated exploitation.

The model assigned an exploitation probability of 0.87, classifying the vulnerability as critical.

8. Discussion

The results indicate that correlation among multiple sources of evidence significantly reduces operational noise. The main advantage of the proposed architecture lies in its ability to contextualize vulnerabilities with observational evidence.

However, some limitations remain. The Bayesian model assumes conditional independence among evidences, which may not fully reflect complex interactions between attack vectors. In addition, the effectiveness of the system depends on the quality of the collected telemetry.

The monitoring overhead based on eBPF remained below 6% additional CPU utilization in the experiments performed.

9. Conclusion

We presented a formal and operational threat-oriented application security architecture that integrates multiple analysis techniques with runtime telemetry and MITRE ATT&CK-based intelligence.

The approach demonstrated substantial improvements in the prioritization of exploitable vulnerabilities and in the reduction of false positives. The integration of evidence from static analysis, dynamic analysis, and operational observation represents a significant advance in modern DevSecOps practices.

Future work includes integration with EPSS metrics, the use of supervised machine learning for dynamic probability tuning, and extension of the architecture to serverless environments and cloud-native platforms.

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